The Data Layer
This page holds the receipts for the first Tokenezo letter. Every checkable number the letter prints appears below, with its source and its as-of date; everything the letter tells as a story or a memory is listed at the bottom, plainly marked as such. This is the culture we intend to build: check us. If a number here is wrong, or you have a better source, bring it — we said we would check each other’s, and we meant it.
One policy note before the tables. We do not publish current city-level or resort-level asking prices, here or anywhere on this site. Researched price points go stale within months, and a stale price quietly poisons every honest number around it. Historical crisis-era figures and dated official statistical series do not have this problem, so those we print in full.
How money actually reaches the best buildings
This section of the letter argues from mechanism, not from statistics, and it contains no figures to source. Its claims — that a public listing carries information costs for the seller, that the buyer pool for prime assets is narrow, that insolvency administrators are legally obliged to advertise while private owners are not — are descriptions of how off-market transactions work, not measurements. The letter invites you to test them against your own city. That invitation is the source.
A story we cannot verify
The Munich dialogue itself is second-hand and told as a parable — see What we could not verify below. The economics around the story check out as follows.
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| German money spent on real estate fell by tens of billions in a single year | Total turnover €174bn (2007) → €131bn (2008) | Immobilienmarktbericht Deutschland 2009 — the official report of the German committees of valuation experts (Gutachterausschüsse) | 2009 report |
| Commercial deals shrank by some eighty per cent in two years | Commercial transaction volume fell ~80% from the 2007 record by 2009 | Deutsche Bundesbank, commercial property indicator system | 2007–2009 |
| Franchise car dealers dying off by the thousands | ~18,000 franchise dealers (2000) → ~8,000 (2010) | ZDK (German motor trade federation) figures, via Autohaus trade press | 2000–2010 |
| House prices in the median German district grew by exactly zero per year, while apartments in the seven big cities rose by a quarter | Median district 0.0%/yr (2010–2012); big-7-city apartments >25% cumulative | Bundesbank Monthly Report, Oct 2013 (BulwienGesa data, 402 districts) | Oct 2013 |
| The Germans coined a word for it — Betongold | Documented vocabulary of the era: the Bundesbank described international investors’ “quest for safer assets”; international press called German property “the next safe haven” | Bundesbank Monthly Report, Oct 2013 (above); CNBC, Aug 2012 | 2012–2013 |
What “buy the dip” was supposed to mean
No statistical claims. “The phrase is older than the internet” is attested — brokers’ advice to buy on the dips appears in print decades before the web. “Perhaps twice in a working lifetime” is a judgement, not a measurement, and the letter presents it as one.
2009, briefly
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Property prices roughly tripled in four years | Lithuanian apartment prices ~tripled 2004–2008 | Ober-Haus Lithuanian apartment price index (running since 1994) | 2004–2008 |
| Bank credit growing forty per cent a year | Baltic bank credit growth >40%/yr, 2004–2008; the Lithuanian mortgage book doubled in 2006 alone | Bank of Lithuania Financial Stability Reviews (2006–2008) | 2004–2008 |
| No loan-to-value cap in the rulebook | Lithuania’s first LTV cap arrived with the Responsible Lending Regulations, adopted September 2011 | Bank of Lithuania, Responsible Lending Regulations (2011) | Sept 2011 |
| The economy contracted 14.8 per cent in a single year | Lithuanian real GDP −14.8% in 2009 | Statistics Lithuania; Eurostat national accounts | 2009 |
| Flats on the coast fell more than forty per cent from their peak | Klaipėda, the coastal anchor city, −43% end-2007 → end-2009 (Vilnius −40%, Panevėžys −44%) | Ober-Haus residential market report, Q4 2009 | end-2009 |
| The older stock halved | Old-construction flats in Vilnius and Klaipėda lost ~50% in two years | Ober-Haus residential market report, Q4 2009 (above) | end-2009 |
| Rents fell by a third | Residential rents −35–40% from peak (the letter prints the conservative end) | Ober-Haus residential market reports, 2009 | 2009 |
| Unemployment rose toward eighteen per cent | ~4.4% (2007) → ~18% at the 2010 peak | Statistics Lithuania; Eurostat labour force survey | 2010 |
| The state borrowed on the markets at 9.75 per cent | €500m eurobond issued August 2009 at 9.75% yield | Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania, 2009 issuance records | Aug 2009 |
Note on the coastal figure: no public price series exists for the resort towns specifically. The letter’s “coast” is anchored on Klaipėda, the documented coastal anchor city 25 km from the resorts. The coastal-agency story from this section is in What we could not verify.
The present, in numbers
The flood
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Central banks of the US and Europe added roughly nine trillion dollars to their balance sheets, 2020–2022 | Federal Reserve: $4.16T (Feb 2020) → $8.97T (Apr 2022); Eurosystem: €4.67T → €8.8T over the same stretch — combined expansion ≈ $9T | Federal Reserve H.4.1, via FRED series WALCL; ECB annual accounts; Bundesbank, PEPP overview (~€1.7T bought under a €1.85T envelope) | Feb 2020 – Apr 2022 |
| Governments spent trillions more in fiscal support | US pandemic fiscal response ~$5.3T (CARES Act $2.2T, Dec 2020 package $0.9T, American Rescue Plan $1.9T, plus smaller acts); EU added NextGenerationEU at €806.9B | Pandemic Response Accountability Committee; European Commission, NextGenerationEU | 2020–2021 |
| Support money settled in company accounts; bank deposits jumped thirty per cent in 2020 alone | Lithuanian bank deposits +30% in 2020, to €32B; corporate deposits +⅓ in one year | Bank of Lithuania, banking sector review | 2020 |
| Two-thirds of all housing purchases in 2021 made without a mortgage — by count; by money, half | 66.6% of housing units, 52.3% by transaction value, bought without a mortgage loan in 2021 | Bank of Lithuania Financial Stability Review 2022 (Centre of Registers data) | 2021 |
| Inflation arrived: over ten per cent at the euro-area peak, above twenty in our corner | Euro area HICP peak 10.6% (Oct 2022); Lithuania peak 22.5% (Sept 2022), among the highest in the euro area | Eurostat HICP release, Nov 2022; ECB Data Portal, Lithuania HICP annual rate | 2022 |
The ladder
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| The S&P 500 fell 34 per cent in twenty-three trading days | Peak 3,386.15 (19 Feb 2020) → 2,237.40 (23 Mar 2020): −33.9% in 23 trading days | S&P Dow Jones Indices daily closes, via FRED series SP500 | Mar 2020 |
| A fall that had taken seventeen months in 2008 | The 2007–2009 peak-to-trough (Oct 2007 → Mar 2009) took ~17 months | S&P Dow Jones Indices | 2007–2009 |
| Setting records again within six months — the shortest bear market ever recorded | New all-time closing high 18 Aug 2020, ~6 months after the pre-crash peak | S&P Dow Jones Indices | Aug 2020 |
| Seventeen months to climb from 6,000 to 7,000 | First close above 6,000: Nov 2024; above 7,000: 15 Apr 2026 | S&P Dow Jones Indices daily closes | Apr 2026 |
| Seven weeks to climb from 7,000 to 7,600 | Record close 7,609.78 on 2 Jun 2026, seven weeks after the 7,000 cross; index at ~7,515 as this page was compiled | S&P Dow Jones Indices daily closes | 13 Jul 2026 |
The dashboard (the exhibit caption)
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPE ~42, exceeded only in December 1999 — 1929 never got here | Shiller CAPE ~41.7; Dec 1999 peak ~44; 1929 peak ~33 | Robert Shiller’s cyclically adjusted P/E series | Jun 2026 |
| US market capitalisation at 238% of GDP, an all-time record | ”Buffett indicator” ~238% of GDP; long-run average ~88%; dot-com peak ~145–159% depending on measure | Advisor Perspectives, Buffett Valuation Indicator | May–Jun 2026 |
| Ten companies holding 41% of the index’s weight on 32% of its earnings | Top-10 constituents ~41% of S&P 500 weight (dot-com peak was ~27%), ~32% of index earnings | S&P Dow Jones Indices constituent data, via RBC Wealth Management analysis | Q2 2026 |
| Margin debt growing at a pace seen only in 2000, 2007 and 2021 | FINRA margin debt $1.42T, +53.7% year-on-year; 4.1% of GDP vs a 1.5% long-run median | FINRA margin statistics, via Advisor Perspectives | Jun 2026 |
Europe and the home market
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU house prices up about 65 per cent since 2015 while rents rose about 22 | EU house price index +64.9%, rent index +21.8%, 2015 → Q4 2025 | Eurostat house price index | Q4 2025 |
| At the extreme end of that table, prices rose 168 per cent in our home market | Lithuania +168%, 2015 → Q4 2025 — third-highest in the EU (Hungary +290%, Portugal +180%) | Eurostat house price index (above) | Q4 2025 |
| …and are re-accelerating as we write | Lithuania +11.9% year-on-year, Q1 2026 (the 2022 peak rate was +22.1%) | Eurostat house price index, latest quarterly release | Q1 2026 |
| Seaside flats with a three-month season; a season of eight warm weekends | Reported Baltic-resort season reality: July occupancy ~80%, August ~65%, off-season loss-making; ~80% of 2023 vacationers came only for weekends; ~90% of guests are domestic | Industry estimates reported by LRT and local press, 2023 — attributed as reported, not independently measured | 2023 |
| …have been asking what year-round Mediterranean resorts ask | We verified this against published asking ranges on both coasts at the time of writing, and we deliberately do not print them — see the stale-price policy at the top of this page. The load-bearing comparison is the season, which is sourced above and does not go stale. | — | Jul 2026 |
Rearmament, honestly handled
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Europe added something like $139 billion of defence spending in a single year | NATO Europe+Canada 2025: | NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report 2025 | 2025 |
| The sharpest rise since the Cold War | World military spending $2.9T; European rise the sharpest since the Cold War | SIPRI press release, 2026 | 2025 data, published 2026 |
| An extra 1.5% of GDP in defence buys about half a per cent of extra GDP by 2028 | European Commission scenario: +1.5% of GDP defence spending → +0.5% GDP by 2028 (fiscal multipliers 0.7–0.8) | European Commission, Spring 2025 Economic Forecast — economic impact of higher defence spending | Spring 2025 |
| Most of the famous €800 billion is borrowing permission, not fresh money | ReArm Europe ≈ €800B = ~€650B of national fiscal-rule escape-clause headroom + €150B in SAFE loans | European Commission, ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan (March 2025) | Mar 2025 |
| A state now sends roughly two-fifths of its budget to the war | Russia: ~38–40% of federal budget to defence and security | SIPRI Insights: military spending in Russia’s budget for a fifth year of war | 2026 budget |
| Growth bought this way ran at four per cent until last year, when the sugar ran out and it grew one | Russian GDP growth +4.3% (2024) → +1.0% (2025) | Rosstat figures, via Bank of Finland Institute (BOFIT) weekly monitoring | 2025 |
The honest concession
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net wages nearly tripled over the decade | Average net monthly wage ~€555 (2015) → €1,541 (Q4 2025), nominal. For completeness: cumulative 2015–2025 inflation was roughly 50–55%, so real growth is much smaller — the letter says “nominal” by printing “nearly tripled” without a real-terms claim | Statistics Lithuania; Sodra (state social insurance) wage statistics | Q4 2025 |
| GDP per head reached 87 per cent of the EU average | Lithuania at 87% of EU-average GDP per capita in purchasing power standards, 2024 — ahead of Estonia (~79%) and level with Poland | Eurostat, GDP per capita in PPS | 2024 |
Our position — and where we may be wrong
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| The excess savings which did that buying were depleted by 2024 | US pandemic excess savings peaked at ~$2.1T (Aug 2021) and were fully depleted by March 2024 | SF Fed Economic Letter: The Rise and Fall of Pandemic Excess Savings; SF Fed blog, May 2024 | Mar 2024 |
| Twice in that run the bears were briefly right, and both times the dip was bought back | 2020: −33.9%, recovered to a record in ~6 months. 2022: −25.4% peak-to-trough (3 Jan → 12 Oct 2022), new records from early 2024 | S&P Dow Jones Indices daily closes | 2020, 2022–2024 |
| The bulls are riding the longest expansion in modern history | A characterization, not a series: the 2009–2020 US bull market was the longest on record before the 2020 interruption; the letter treats 2009–2026, with its two bought-back bears, as one run. Reasonable people can score it differently — that is why the two interruptions are itemised above | S&P Dow Jones Indices | Jul 2026 |
| At today’s prices, rental yield no longer carries the case | Follows from the Eurostat pair above: prices +168% vs rents +21.8% (2015 → Q4 2025) compress gross yields mechanically. No new source needed — it is the same two numbers | Eurostat house price and rent indices | Q4 2025 |
Three arenas
The letter’s only checkable reference here is Universe 25, and it deserves the full record — including the part that argues against us.
| Claim | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| ”The experiment in which mice were given everything” | John B. Calhoun’s Universe 25 at NIMH, from July 1968: 4 breeding pairs, unlimited food and water; population doubled every ~55 days, peaked at ~2,200 around month 19 (designed capacity ~3,840), then declined to extinction by 1973. Calhoun documented the “behavioral sink” and “the beautiful ones” — males who withdrew from all social function | Calhoun, “Death Squared: The Explosive Growth and Demise of a Mouse Population”, Proc. Royal Society of Medicine, 1973 | 1968–1973 |
| ”Scientists still argue about what it proved” | The honest caveat, in full: “Universe 25” was Calhoun’s 25th iteration, not a replicated result. Medical historian Edmund Ramsden showed the pathology tracked forced social interaction and loss of control over space, not raw density, and human follow-up studies found crowding does not reliably produce the same effects. Ramsden’s summary: “Rats may suffer from crowding; human beings can cope.” The letter uses the experiment as a parable about hunger, not as a law about people — and this caveat is why | Science History Institute, “Mouse Heaven or Mouse Hell?”; Ramsden & Adams, historical work on Calhoun’s rodent experiments | critique published 2008–2011 |
The little house
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seven kilometres from the Polish border, a town of four thousand people called Lazdijai | Lazdijai is Lithuania’s southernmost town, ~7 km from the Polish border, in the Dzūkija lake region; population ~4,000–4,500 and declining | Statistics Lithuania population data; standard reference | 2024 |
| A one-storey log house, built in 1936 | Log-wall construction (“rąstai”), built 1936, reconstructed 1976, one storey, 177.06 m² | State Enterprise Centre of Registers (Registrų centras), official property extract. We hold the document; a copy with personal data redacted will be published with the house’s project page | extract dated Dec 2024 |
| The state’s own registry values it at about thirteen and a half thousand euros | Mass-valuation market value €13,500, valuation date 3 Dec 2024. Caveat that cuts both ways: mass valuation is a statistical model, not an appraisal or a transaction price — it is the state’s number, and we quote it as exactly that | Centre of Registers extract (above) | 3 Dec 2024 |
The invitation
| Claim in the letter | Figure | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tokenised real estate in Europe is a transferable security | Tokens representing real-estate-backed financial instruments qualify as transferable securities under MiFID II (Directive 2014/65/EU); MiCA (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, fully applicable 30 Dec 2024) explicitly carves out financial instruments from its scope — so the securities regime, the stricter one, applies | MiCA Art. 2(4)(a); MiFID II; practitioner overview: Norton Rose Fulbright, regulating crypto-assets in Europe | in force |
| (Context, for scale — the letter makes no market-size claim) | Tokenized real-world assets on-chain, excluding stablecoins: ~$24B (Jun 2025), ~$30B (Q3 2025). Long-run forecasts range from $2T to $30T by the 2030s — those are projections, and we label them as such | RedStone, RWA in on-chain finance report, Jun 2025; InvesTax, Q3 2025 RWA tokenization market report | Q3 2025 |
What we could not verify
We promised to flag these, so here they are, in one place.
-
The Munich dialogue. The story of the buyer, the car window and the agent’s answer reached us second-hand, and the letter says so in its own title for that section. We could not and did not verify the conversation. What we verified is every checkable number around it — the turnover collapse, the dealer die-off, the Bundesbank’s core-versus-periphery measurements — and they are all in the table above. Treat the dialogue as a parable whose scenery happens to be accurately painted.
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The coastal agency. The account of an agency whose revenues “never flinched through 2010, 2011, 2012” on the strength of eastern buyers of premium seaside flats was reported by Palangos Tiltas, a local newspaper, in 2013. It is a single local source and we found no second one. The letter presents it as one agency’s telling, and so do we.
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Market memory. Two items in the letter rest partly on the lived memory of people who worked through those markets rather than on a published series: the claim that the resort coast specifically fell as hard as the documented coastal anchor city (no public resort-town price series from 2008–2009 exists — Klaipėda’s −43% is the nearest measured point, 25 km away), and the characterisations of off-market practice — “a few dozen names”, “price discovered across a lunch table”, “twice in a working lifetime”. These are testimony, not statistics. We printed them because we believe them; we flag them because belief is not a source.
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The Mediterranean comparison. As noted in the table, the price-parity claim about the Baltic coast was checked against current asking ranges that we decline to reprint under our stale-price policy. If you want to verify it, the portals are public and the exercise takes ten minutes — which is rather the point of this page.
Methodology: this data layer was compiled from a research pass of roughly 640 web lookups; every load-bearing claim was checked against at least two independent sources before the letter went out, and single-source items are identified as such above. Compiled 14 July 2026.